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ABSTRACT 
Climate is complex, uncertain, and, over horizons that are relevant for policy decisions, varies 
little. Using evidence-based (scientific) forecasting principles, we determined that for such a 
situation a naïve “no change” extrapolation method was the appropriate benchmark. We tested 
this benchmark against global mean temperatures. To be useful to policy makers, a proposed 
forecasting method would have to provide forecasts that were substantially more accurate than 
the benchmark. We calculated benchmark forecasts against the UK Met Office Hadley Centre’s 
annual average thermometer data from 1850 through 2007. The accuracy of forecasts from our 
naïve model is such that even perfect forecasts would be unlikely to help policy makers. For 
example, mean absolute errors for 20- and 50-year horizons were 0.18°C and 0.24°C. We 
nevertheless evaluated the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s 1992 projected 
warming rate of 0.03°C-per-year. The small sample of errors from ex ante forecasts for 1992 
through 2008 was practically indistinguishable from the naïve benchmark errors. To get a larger 
sample and evidence on longer horizons we backcast successively from 1974 to 1850. Averaged 
over all horizons, IPCC errors were more than seven-times greater than errors from the 
benchmark. Relative errors were larger for longer backcast horizons.  
Key words: backcasting, climate model, decision making, ex ante forecasts, out-of-sample errors, 
predictability, public policy, relative absolute errors, unconditional forecasts. 
  
 
 Introduction 
One of the principles of scientific forecasting is to ensure that a series can be predicted 
(Armstrong, 2001, Principle #1.4). We applied the principle to the key climate change problem of 
forecasting global mean temperatures over the policy-relevant long term. We did so by examining 
the unconditional ex ante forecast errors from a naïve benchmark model. By ex ante forecasts, we 
mean forecasts for periods that were not taken into account when the forecasting model was 
developed—it is trivial to construct a model that fits known data better than a naïve model can.  
Benchmark errors are the standard by which to determine whether alternative scientifically-based 
forecasting methods can provide useful forecasts. When benchmark errors are large, it is possible 
that alternative methods would provide useful forecasts. When benchmark errors are small, it is 
less likely that other methods will be able to provide improvements in accuracy that are useful to 
decision makers. 
Conditions of forecastability 
By forecastability we mean the ability to improve upon a naïve benchmark model. Three 
important conditions of forecastability are variability, simplicity, and certainty.  
 
Variability 
The first step in testing whether a forecasting method can help is to check for variability. If little 
or no variability is expected, forecasting is trivial.  
In the case of global mean temperatures, warnings since 1990 from the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) and others (Hansen 2008) that we are experiencing dangerous 
manmade global warming suggest variability. Indeed, when we examined local, regional and 
global mean temperature data we found that changes are common. For example, Exhibit 1 
displays Antarctic temperature data from the ice-core record for the 800,000 years to 1950. The 
data are in the form of temperature, relative to the average for the last one-thousand-years of the 
record (950 to 1950 AD), in degrees Celsius. The data show long-term variations. The three most 
recent values are roughly 1 to 3°C warmer than the reference thousand-year average, which is at 
0°C in the graph. Moreover, there was variability around trends and the trends were unstable over 
all time periods. In other words, trends appear to be positive about as often as they were negative. 
Although the long-term temperatures in Exhibit 1 show variability, the variability for policy 
relevant time periods (i.e. years and decades), is quite small, as we will show below. 
 
INSERT EXHIBIT 1 ABOUT HERE 
800,000-year Record of Temperature Change 
 
 
Simplicity 
To the extent that a situation is complex, it is more difficult to forecast. For example, daily 
movements in stock market prices involve complex interactions among many variables. As a 
consequence daily stock price movements are characterized as a random walk. The naive no-
change benchmark method for forecasting stock prices has defeated alternative investment 
strategies. Attempts to improve upon this model have led to massive losses on occasion, such as 
with the failure of hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management in the late-1990s. 
Global mean temperatures are also subject to many interacting variables. The Sun is clearly one 
important influence on Earthly temperatures. The Sun’s intensity varies, the Earth-Sun distance 
varies, and so does the geometrical orientation of the Earth toward the Sun. The approximately 
11-year solar activity cycle, for example, is typically associated with a global average 
temperature range of approximately 0.4°C between the warmest and coldest parts of the cycle, 
and a much larger range near the poles (Camp and Tung 2007). Variations in the irradiance of the 
Sun over decades and centuries also influence the Earth’s climate (Soon 2009). Other influences 
on both shorter and longer-term temperatures include the type and extent of clouds, the extent and 
reflectivity of snow and ice, ocean currents and the release and absorption of heat by the oceans. 
 
 
 Certainty 
There is high uncertainty with respect to the direction and magnitude of changes in the various 
postulated causal factors such as greenhouse gases (their sources and direction of causality), the 
visible and infrared radiation emitted from the sun, volcanic eruptions, ocean currents, ice cover, 
and so on. 
Those who warn of dangerous manmade global warming assert that it is being caused by 
increasing concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere as a result of human 
emissions. However, the relationship between human emissions and total atmospheric 
concentrations is not well-understood due to the complexity of global carbon cycling via diverse 
physical, chemical, and biological interactions among the CO2 reservoirs of the Earth system. 
Moreover, there are debates among scientists as to whether additions to atmospheric CO2 play a 
role of any importance in climate change (e.g., Carter et al. 2006; Soon 2007; Koutsoyiannis et al. 
2008; Lindzen 2009). Indeed, 650,000 years of ice core data suggest that atmospheric 
concentrations of CO2 have followed temperature changes (Soon 2007). 
There is also uncertainty about temperature series that have been used by the IPCC. These have 
been challenged on the basis that they are not true global averages, and that they suffer from “heat 
island” effects whereby weather stations that were once beyond the edge of town have become 
progressively surrounded by urban development. Other influences on temperature readings 
include the substitution of electronic thermometers, which are sensitive to heat eddies; the 
reduction of the number of temperature stations (especially in remote areas); and maintenance 
associated with the housing of the temperature gauges (the boxes are supposed to be white). 
Anthony Watts and colleagues have documented problems with weather station readings at 
surfacestations.org. Analysis by McKitrick and Michaels (2007) suggested that the size of the 
surface warming in the last two decades of the 20th century was overestimated by a factor of two. 
Finally, long time-series of reliable global temperature data and of the host of plausible causal 
variables are not available.  
 
An appropriate benchmark model 
The conditions associated with global mean temperatures over the time period relevant to policy 
making—low variability, uncertainty, and complexity—suggest that the temperatures will have 
low predictability. We used these conditions to help select an appropriate benchmark forecasting 
method by following the guidance provided by findings from comparative empirical studies from 
numerous areas of forecasting. The findings are summarized in Armstrong (2001) in the form of 
principles, and are available on the public service website ForPrin.com.  
With some objective data available on temperatures and a situation characterized by a poor 
knowledge of relationships, poor domain knowledge, unstable trends (Exhibit 1) but, as we will 
show, low variability over policy-relevant horizons, the principles led us to select the naïve, no-
change, forecasting model as our benchmark. 
We used the HadCRUt3 “best estimate” annual average temperature differences from 1850 to 
2007 from the U.K. Met Office Hadley Centre (Hadley) 1 to examine the benchmark errors for 
global mean temperatures (Exhibit 2).  
INSERT EXHIBIT 2 
 
 
Errors from the benchmark model 
We used each year’s mean global temperature as a naïve forecast of each subsequent year in the 
future and calculated the errors relative to the measurements for those years. For example, the 
year 1850 temperature measurement from Hadley was our forecast of the average temperature for 
each year from 1851 through 1950. We calculated the differences between our naïve forecast and 
the Hadley measurement for each year of this 100-year forecast horizon. In this way we obtained 
from the Hadley data 157 error estimates for one-year-ahead forecasts, 156 for two-year-ahead 
forecasts, and so on up to 58 error estimates for 100-year-ahead forecasts; a total of 10,750 
forecasts across all horizons 
Exhibit 3 shows that mean absolute errors from our naïve model increased from less than 0.1°C 
for one-year-ahead forecasts to less than 0.4°C for 100-year-ahead forecasts. Maximum absolute 
errors increased from slightly more than 0.3°C for one-year-ahead forecasts to less than 1.0°C for 
100-year-ahead forecasts. 
Overwhelmingly, errors were no-more-than 0.5°C, as is shown in Exhibit 4. For horizons less-
than-65- eight of our ex-ante forecasts were more than 0.5°C different 
 
years, fewer than one-in-
                                                        
1 Obtained from http://hadobs.metoffice.com/hadcrut3/diagnostics/global/nh+sh/annual on 9 October, 2008. 
from the Hadley measurement. All forecasts for horizons up-to-80-years and more than 95% of 
forecasts for horizons from-81-to-100-years were within 1°C of the Hadley figure. The overall 
maximum error from all 10,750 forecasts for all horizons was 1.08°C; which was from an 87-
year-ahead forecast for the year 1998. 
INSERT EXHIBIT 3 
 
INSERT EXHIBIT 4 
 
 
                                                        
 
Performance of Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change projections 
As the naïve benchmark model performs so well it is hard to determine what additional benefits 
public policy makers would get from a better model. Indeed, we cannot think how even perfect 
forecasts of annual global mean temperature would be useful to policy makers. Governments did 
however, via the United Nations, establish the IPCC to search for a better model. The IPCC 
forecasts provide an opportunity to illustrate the use of our naïve benchmark.  
Green and Armstrong (2008) analyzed the IPCC procedures and concluded that they violated 72 
of the principles for proper scientific forecasting. For important forecasts, it is critical that all 
proper procedures are followed. An invalid forecasting method might provide an accurate 
forecast by chance, but this would not qualify it as an appropriate method. Nevertheless, because 
the IPCC forecasts influence major policy decisions, we compare its predictions with our naïve 
benchmark.  
To test any forecasting method, it is necessary to exclude data that were used to develop the 
model; that is, the testing must be done using out-of-sample data. The most obvious out-of-
sample data are the observations that occurred after the forecast was made.  
 
We used the IPCC’s 1992 forecast, which was an update of their 1990 forecast, for our 
demonstration. The 1992 forecast was for an increase of 0.03°C per year (IPCC 1990 p. xi, IPCC 
1992 p.17). We used this forecast because it has had a big influence on policymakers, coming out 
as it did in time for the Rio Earth Summit, which produced inter alia Agenda 21 and the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. According to the United Nations web page 
on the Summit 2, “The Earth Summit influenced all subsequent UN conferences…”. Using the 
1992 forecast also allowed for the longest ex ante forecast test.  
 
Evaluation method 
We followed the procedure that we had used for our benchmark model and calculated absolute 
errors as the unsigned difference between the IPCC forecast and the Hadley figure for the same 
year. We then compared these IPCC forecast errors with those from the benchmark model using 
the cumulative relative absolute error or CumRAE (Armstrong and Collopy 1992).  
The CumRAE is the sum across all forecast horizons of the errors (ignoring signs) from the 
method being evaluated divided by the equivalent sum of benchmark errors. For example, a 
CumRAE of 1.0 would indicate that the evaluated-method errors and benchmark errors came to 
the same total while a figure of 0.8 would indicate that the evaluated-method errors were 20% 
lower than the benchmark’s over all periods in the forecast horizon.  
We are concerned about forecasting accuracy by forecast horizon and so calculated error scores 
for each horizon, and then averaged across the horizons. Thus, the CumRAEs we report are the 
sum of the mean absolute errors across horizons divided by the equivalent sum of benchmark 
errors. 
 
2 http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html  
 Forecasts from 1992 through 2008 using 1992 IPCC projected warming rate 
We created an IPCC forecast series from 1992 to 2008 by starting with the 1991 Hadley figure 
and adding 0.03°C per year. It was also possible to test the IPCC projected warming rate against 
the University of Alabama at Huntsville’s data on global near surface temperature measured from 
satellites using microwave sounding units (UAH), which are available from 1979. We created 
another forecast series by starting with the 1991 UAH figure.  
Benchmark forecasts for the two series were based on the 1991 Hadley and UAH temperatures, 
respectively, for all years. This process, by including estimates for 2008 from both sources, gave 
us two small samples of 17 years of out-of-sample forecasts. When tested against Hadley 
measures, IPCC errors were essentially the same as those from our benchmark forecasts 
(CumRAE 0.98); they were nearly twice as large (CumRAE 1.82) when tested against the UAH 
satellite measures. 
We also employed successive forecasting by using each year of the Hadley data from 1991 out to 
2007 in turn as the base from which to forecast from one up to 17 years ahead. We obtained a 
total of 136 forecasts from each of the 1992 IPCC projected warming rate and our benchmark 
model over horizons from one to 17 years. We found that averaged across all 17 forecast 
horizons, the 1992 IPCC projected warming rate forecast errors for the period 1992 to 2008 were 
16% smaller than errors from our benchmark; the CumRAE was 0.84.   
We repeated the successive forecasting test using UAH data. The 1992 IPCC projected warming 
rate forecast errors for the period 1992 to 2008 were 5% smaller than errors from our benchmark 
(CumRAE 0.95).  
Assessed against the UAH data, the average of the mean errors for all 17 horizons was 0.215°C 
for rolling forecasts from the benchmark and 0.203°C for the IPCC projected warming rate 
forecasts. The IPCC forecasts thus provided an error reduction of 0.012°C for this small sample 
of short-horizon forecasts.  
The concern of policymakers is with long-term climate forecasting, and the ex ante analysis we 
have described was limited to a small sample of short-horizon forecasts. To address these 
limitations, we used backcasting.  
 
 
Backcasts from 1974 through 1850 using 1992 IPCC projected warming rate 
Backcasting, as the name implies, involves making predictions about earlier times. It is an 
appropriate method when decreases in a causal factor have the opposite effect to increases. The 
method was first described by Theil (1966), who showed a close correspondence in the size of the 
errors for eight-year-ahead forecasts and corresponding backcasts for studies of two different 
industries: agricultural and basic metals. Armstrong also found a close correspondence between 
the six-year-ahead forecast and backcast errors for the international photographic market (1985, 
pp. 343-345). 
 
Dangerous manmade global warming became an issue of public concern after NASA scientist 
James Hansen testified on the subject to the U.S. Congress on 23 June 1988 (McKibben 2007) 
after a 13 year period from 1975 over which global temperature estimates were up more than they 
were down. The IPCC (2007) authors explain however that “Global atmospheric concentrations 
of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide have increased markedly as a result of human 
activities since 1750” (p. 2). There have even been claims that human activity has been causing 
 global warming for at least 5,000 years (Bergquist 2008). Global atmospheric concentrations of 
CO2 appear to have increased from 285 parts-per-million in 1850 to 383 parts-per-million in 2007 
3.  
Thus, the IPCC’s projected warming rate should be just as relevant going backwards in time, as a 
projected cooling rate, as it is going forward. Indeed, this is the clear implication of the IPCC’s 
scenarios whereby the projected warming rate is lower for scenarios with lower CO2 emissions. 
Our naïve model, based on the assumption that there is no basis to assume a trend, obviously 
works both ways.  
We used the Hadley data from 1974 through to the beginning of the series in 1850 for our 
backcast test. The period is not strictly out-of-sample, however, in that the IPCC authors knew in 
retrospect that there had been a broadly upward trend in the Hadley temperature series. From 
1850 to 1974 there were 66 years in which the temperature increased from the previous year and 
59 in which it declined. There will, therefore, be some positive trend that would provide a better 
model for the backcast test period than would our naïve benchmark, and so the benchmark is 
disadvantaged for the period under consideration. In other words, the thinking of the IPCC 
experts was likely influenced such that their forecasting model likely fits the 1850 to 1974 trend 
more closely than it would had they been unaware of the data. Recall, however, that the 
temperature variations shown by the longer temperature series in Exhibit 1 suggest that there is 
no assurance that the trend will continue in the future. 
 
We first created a single backcast series by starting with the 1975 Hadley figure and subtracting 
the 1992-IPCC-model’s 0.03°C from each year, starting with 1974, and repeated the process all 
the way back to 1851. Our naïve benchmark backcast was equal to the 1975 Hadley figure for all 
years. This process provided backcast data for each of the 125 years. 
The 1992 IPCC backcast errors totaled more than ten times the benchmark errors (CumRAE 
10.4). We also tested the 2007 IPCC’s weaker Scenario-B trend of 0.02°C p.a. (IPCC 2007, p. 
13), but it made little difference to the relative accuracy of the backcast; the 2007 IPCC errors 
were in total nearly seven times larger than the benchmark errors (CumRAE 6.72).  
We then successively backcast by using each year from 1975 back to 1851 as the base from 
which to backcast from one up to 100 years back using the 1992 IPCC projected warming rate 
and our benchmark model. This yielded a total of 7,550 backcasts covering the period 1974 to 
1850. 
We found that across all forecast horizons, the 1992-IPCC-model backcast errors for the period 
were more than seven-times greater than errors from our benchmark (CumRAE 7.23). The 
relative errors increased rapidly with backcast horizon. For example for horizons one-through-10 
the CumRAE was 1.45, while for horizons 41-through-50 it was 6.77 and for horizons 91-
through-100 it was 12.6.  
Recall that Green and Armstrong (2007) found that the IPCC’s projections were based on 
unscientific procedures. It is no surprise, then, that our benchmark backcasts, derived using 
empirically-based forecasting principles, were more accurate. We had not, however, anticipated 
ark the errors from using the IPCC projected warming rate how much worse than the benchm
                                                         
3 Global mean CO2 mixing ratio estimates for this period are available from NASA’s Goddard Institute for 
Space Studies at http://data.giss.nasa.gov/modelforce/ghgases/Fig1A.ext.txt.  
 would be. This finding was especially surprising given that the climate scientists were well aware 
of the history.  
The tendency for people to believe that “things have changed” and the future cannot be judged by 
the past is quite common. The 1980 bet between Julian Simon and Paul Ehrlich on the 1990 price 
of raw materials was a high-profile example. Simon’s position was that real commodity prices 
had fallen over human history and that there were good reasons why this was so. It was therefore 
a mistake, he maintained, to extrapolate recent price increases. The five commodity metals that 
Ehrlich selected—copper, chromium, nickel, tin, and tungsten—all fell in price over the ten year 
period, and Simon won the bet (Tierney 1990). 
While backcasting may seem strange to some, the IPCC did not provide evidence that their 
projected warming rate would only apply to the future. Those who would argue that it is not 
proper to apply a forecasting model for global average temperatures backwards in time need to 
provide conclusive evidence that there has been a change in the climate system such that only 
data since the mid-1970s is relevant for long-term climate forecasting.  
 
Implications for climate policy 
To base public policy decisions on forecasts of global mean temperature one would have to show 
that changes are forecastable and that a valid evidence-based forecasting procedure would 
provide more accurate forecasts than those from the naïve “no change” benchmark model.  
We did not address the issue of forecasting the net benefits or cost of any climate change that 
might be forecast. Here again one would need to establish a benchmark forecast, presumably a 
model assuming that changes in either direction would have no net effects. Researchers who have 
examined this issue are not in agreement on what is the optimum temperature. 
Finally, success in forecasting climate change and the effects of climate change must then be 
followed by valid forecasts of the effects of alternative policies. And, again, one would need 
benchmark forecasts; presumably based on an assumption of taking no action, as that is typically 
the least costly. As we noted in Armstrong, et al. (2008), this was overlooked in the U.S. 
Department of the Interior’s assessment of the polar bear issue.  
The problem is complex. A failure at any of one of the three stages of forecasting—temperature 
change, impacts of changes, and impacts of alternative policies—would imply that climate 
change policies have no scientific basis. 
 
Conclusions 
Global mean temperatures were found to be remarkably stable over policy-relevant horizons. The 
benchmark forecast is that the global mean temperature for each year for the rest of this century 
will be within 0.5°C of the 2008 figure.  
There is little room for improving the accuracy of forecasts from our naïve benchmark model. In 
fact, it is questionable whether practical benefits could be gained by obtaining perfect forecasts. 
While the Hadley temperature data shown in Exhibit 2 shows an upwards drift over the last 
century or so, the longer series in Exhibit 1 shows that such trends can occur naturally over long 
periods. Moreover there is some concern that the upward trend might be at least in part an artifact 
 of measurement errors rather than a genuine global warming. Even if one puts these reservations 
aside, our analysis shows that errors from our naïve benchmark forecasts would have been so 
small that they would not have been of concern to decision makers who relied on them. For all 
practical purposes, global mean temperatures do not seem to be predictable. 
Earlier research has shown that the IPCC forecasting methods violated scientific forecasting 
principles and IPCC forecasts should not, therefore, be used for making public-policy decisions. 
Our findings in this paper reinforce that conclusion. 
The small sample of 17 years of IPCC 1992-model forecasts was similar in overall accuracy to 
the naïve benchmark forecasts. Rolling forecasts from 1992 through 2008 using the IPCC’s 
model were only trivially more accurate than the benchmark forecasts and the mean error 
reduction of 0.012°C would not seem useful for policy recommendations.  
Climate policy is concerned with longer horizons and so our small sample of short horizon 
forecasts was a weak test. To address these issues we tested the relative accuracy of the IPCC 
forecasts using rolling backcasts over horizons of up to 100 years. The IPCC backcast errors were 
seven times larger than those from our naïve benchmark, and the relative errors increased as the 
backcast horizon increased. 
 
Acknowledgements 
We are grateful to Fred Collopy, Robert Fildes, Paul Goodwin, Rob Hyndman, Demetris 
Koutsoyiannis, Spyros Makridakis, Malcolm Wright, and Marc Wildi for their many helpful 
comments and suggestions. We did not accept all suggestions, and our acknowledgement does 
not imply that those who helped us agree with the entire content of our final paper.  
 
REFERENCES 
Armstrong, J. S. (1985). Long-Range Forecasting. New York: John Wiley. 
Armstrong, J. S. (2001). Principles of Forecasting. Boston: Kluwer. 
Armstrong, J. S., & Collopy, F. (1992). Error measures for generalizing about forecasting methods: 
Empirical comparisons. International Journal of Forecasting, 8, 69-80. 
Armstrong, J. S., Green, K. C., & Soon, W., (2008), Polar Bear Population Forecasts: A Public-Policy 
Forecasting Audit, Interfaces (with commentary and reply), 38, 381-405. 
Bergquist, L. (2008). Humans started causing global warming 5,000 years ago, UW study says. Journal 
Sentinel, posted 17 December, http://www.jsonline.com/news/education/36279759.html  
Camp, C. D., & Tung, K.-K. (2007). Surface warming by the solar cycle as revealed by the composite 
mean difference projection. Geophysical Research Letters, 34, L14703, doi:10.1029/2007GL030207. 
Carter, R. M., de Freitas, C. R., Goklany, I. M., Holland, D., & Lindzen, R. S. (2006). The Stern Review: A 
Dual Critique, Part I: The Science. World Economics, 7, 167-198. 
Green, K.C., & Armstrong, J.S. (2007). Global warming: Forecasts by scientists versus scientific forecasts, 
Energy & Environment, 18, 997-1022. 
 Hansen, J. (2008). Tipping point: Perspective of a climatologist. In State of the Wild 2008-2009: A Global 
Portrait of Wildlife, Wildlands, and Oceans. W. Woods, Ed. Wildlife Conservation Society/Island Press, 
pp. 6-15.  
IPCC (1990). Climate Change: The IPCC Scientific Assessment. Edited by J.T. Houghton, G.J. Jenkins, 
and J.J. Ephraums. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, United Kingdom. 
IPCC (1992). Climate Change 1992: The Supplementary Report to the IPCC Scientific Assessment. Edited 
by J.T. Houghton, B.A. Callander, and S.K. S.K. Varney. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, United 
Kingdom. 
IPCC (2007). Summary for Policymakers, in Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. 
Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change [Solomon, S., D. Qin, M. Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M.Tignor and 
H.L. Miller (eds.)]. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York, NY, USA. 
Koutsoyiannis, D., Efstratiadis, A., Mamassis, N., and Christofides, A. (2008). On the credibility of climate 
predictions. Hydrological Sciences Journal, 53, 671–684. 
Lindzen, R. S. (2009). Climate Science: Is it currently designed to answer questions? Forthcoming in 
proceedings of Creativity and Creative Inspiration in Mathematics, Science, and Engineering: Developing a 
Vision for the Future: San Marino, August 2008. 
McKibben, W. (2007). Warning on warming. New York Review of Books, 54, 15 March. 
McKitrick, R., & Michaels, P. J. (2007). Quantifying the influence of anthropogenic surface processes and 
inhomogeneities on gridded global climate data. Journal of Geophysical Research, 112,  
doi:10.1029/2007JD008465. 
Soon, W. (2007) Implications of the secondary role of carbon dioxide and methane forcing in the climate 
change: Past, present and future. Physical Geography, 28, 97-125. 
Soon, W. (2009). The solar Arctic connection on multidecadal to centennial timescales: Empirical 
evidence, mechanistic explanation, and testable consequences. Physical Geography, under review. 
Theil, H. (1966). Applied Economic Forecasting. Chicago: Rand McNally. 
Tierney, J. (1990). Betting the planet. New York Times, December 2. 
